Adversarial Learning Meets Large Language Models

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Large Language Models (LLMs): a demo

XI

What are large language models (LLMs)?

Large language models (LLMs) are a type of artificial intelligence (AI) system designed to understand and generate human language. They are based on deep learning neural networks, which use vast amounts of data to train the model to predict the probability of a given sequence of words or generate new text. LLMs are able to perform a wide range of language-related tasks, such as language translation, summarization, question answering, and even creative writing. Some of the most well-known LLMs include GPT-3, BERT, and T5, which have been developed by companies like OpenAI and Google. These models have demonstrated impressive abilities to generate human-like language and have the potential to transform many industries, including healthcare, finance, and entertainment.

ChatGPT

https://chat.openai.com/chat

Success of large language models: code generation





Problem (input)

D.Backspace

You are given two strings s and t, both consisting of lowercase English letters. You are going to type the string s character by character, from the first character to the last one.

When typing a character, instead of pressing the button corresponding to it, you can press the "Backspace" button. It deletes the last character you have typed among those that aren't deleted yet (or does nothing if there are no characters in the current string). For example, if s is "abcbd" and you press Backspace instead of typing the first and the fourth characters, you will get the string "bd" (the first press of Backspace deletes no character, and the second press deletes the character 'c'). Another example, if s is "abcaa" and you press Backspace instead of the last two letters, then the resulting text is "a".

Your task is to determine whether you can obtain the string t, if you type the string s and press "Backspace" instead of typing several (maybe zero) characters of s.

Input

The first line contains a single integer q ($1 \le q \le 10^5$) — the number of test cases.

The first line of each test case contains the string s ($1 \le |s| \le 10^5$). Each character of s is a lowercase English letter.

The second line of each test case contains the string t ($1 \le |t| \le 10^5$). Each character of t is a lowercase English letter.

It is guaranteed that the total number of characters in the strings over all test cases does not exceed $2 \cdot 10^5$.

Output

For each test case, print "YES" if you can obtain the string t by typing the string s and replacing some characters with presses of "Backspace" button, or "NO" if you cannot.

You may print each letter in any case (YES, yes, Yes will all be recognized as positive answer, NO, no and nO will all be recognized as negative answer).

Input

```
4
ababa
ba
ababa
bb
aaa
aaaa
aababa
ababa
```

Output

```
YES
NO
NO
YES
```

Note

Consider the example test from the statement.

In order to obtain "ba" from "ababa", you may press Backspace instead of typing the first and the fourth characters.

There's no way to obtain "bb" while typing "ababa".

There's no way to obtain "aaaa" while typing "aaa".

In order to obtain "ababa" while typing "aababa", you have to press Backspace instead of typing the first character, then type all the remaining characters.



AlphaCode: Average human programmer performance (top 54.3%) in coding contests

Li, …, **Chen** et al., Competition-level Code Generation with AlphaCode, Science 2022.

Success of large language models: mathematical reasoning

Question: A line parallel to $y = 4x + 6$ passes through $(5, 10)$. What is the y-coordinate of the point where this line crosses the y-axis?

Target: Since the line is parallel to $y = 4x + 6$, we know that its slope is 4. Thus the equation of the line is $y = 4x + b$ where b is the y-intercept. Plugging $(5, 10)$ into this gives $10 = 4 \cdot 5 + b \Rightarrow b = \boxed{-10}$ which is what we wanted.

Model output: The line is parallel to $y = 4x + 6$, which means that it has the same slope as $y = 4x + 6$. Since the line passes through $(5, 10)$, we can use the point-slope form of a line to find the equation of the line:

$$\begin{aligned} y - 10 &= 4(x - 5) \\ y - 10 &= 4x - 20 \\ y &= 4x - 10 \end{aligned}$$

Now that we have the equation of the line, we can find the y-coordinate of the point where the line crosses the y-axis by substituting $x = 0$ into the equation:

$$y = 4 \cdot 0 - 10 = \boxed{-10}.$$

Minerva: solve >50% high school math problems

Lewkowycz et al., Solving Quantitative Reasoning Problems with Language Models.

Prompting techniques for reasoning: chain-of-thought prompting

Standard Prompting

Model Input

Q: Roger has 5 tennis balls. He buys 2 more cans of tennis balls. Each can has 3 tennis balls. How many tennis balls does he have now?

A: The answer is 11.

Q: The cafeteria had 23 apples. If they used 20 to make lunch and bought 6 more, how many apples do they have?

Model Output

A: The answer is 27.

Wei et al., Chain-of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Models, NeurIPS 2022.

Prompting techniques for reasoning: chain-of-thought prompting

Standard Prompting

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Q: Roger has 5 tennis balls. He buys 2 more cans of tennis balls. Each can has 3 tennis balls. How many tennis balls does he have now?

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Exemplar

Q: The cafeteria had 23 apples. If they used 20 to make lunch and bought 6 more, how many apples do they have?

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Model Output

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Chain-of-Thought Prompting

Model Input

Q: Roger has 5 tennis balls. He buys 2 more cans of tennis balls. Each can has 3 tennis balls. How many tennis balls does he have now?

Intermediate steps

A: Roger started with 5 balls. 2 cans of 3 tennis balls each is 6 tennis balls. 5 + 6 = 11. The answer is 11.

Q: The cafeteria had 23 apples. If they used 20 to make lunch and bought 6 more, how many apples do they have?

Model Output

A: The cafeteria had 23 apples originally. They used 20 to make lunch. So they had 23 - 20 = 3. They bought 6 more apples, so they have 3 + 6 = 9. The answer is 9.

Wei et al., Chain-of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Models, NeurIPS 2022.

Prompting techniques for reasoning: least-to-most prompting



Zhou et al., Least-to-Most Prompting Enables Complex Reasoning in Large Language Models, ICLR 2023.

Prompting techniques for reasoning: self-consistency



Wang et al., Self-Consistency Improves Chain of Thought Reasoning in Language Models, ICLR 2023.

Large language models still have issues: hallucination

XI

Please explain large language models developed by Google.

Google has developed several large language models, which are artificial intelligence systems trained on vast amounts of text data to understand human language and generate natural-sounding responses to text or speech input. Some of these models are:

1. BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers): BERT is a transformer-based model that was trained on a large amount of text data to generate contextually relevant word embeddings. This model is widely used in natural language processing tasks such as text classification, question answering, and language generation.
2. GPT (Generative Pre-trained Transformer): GPT is another transformer-based model that was trained on a large corpus of text data to generate coherent and grammatically correct language. GPT-3, the third iteration of this model, has 175 billion parameters and is currently the largest language model in the world.
3. T5 (Text-to-Text Transfer Transformer): T5 is a transformer-based model that was trained on a diverse set of natural language processing tasks such as machine translation, question answering, and text summarization. T5 can perform multiple tasks using a single model by generating text in different formats.

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Factually wrong

LLM + search did not resolve the issue (yet)



New Bing can still make factual mistakes

https://twitter.com/MovingToTheSun/status/1625156575202537474
https://www.theverge.com/2023/2/15/23599072/microsoft-ai-bing-personality-conversations-spy-employees-webcams

LLM + search did not resolve the issue (yet)



New Bing can still **confidently** make factual mistakes

https://twitter.com/MovingToTheSun/status/1625156575202537474
https://www.theverge.com/2023/2/15/23599072/microsoft-ai-bing-personality-conversations-spy-employees-webcams

Current LLMs are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks



The model leaks its prompt with the instruction "Ignore previous instructions."

https://twitter.com/kliu128/status/1623472922374574080

Robustness issues also exist for machine learning models before LLMs

Adversarial Examples



Data Poisoning



Model Stealing



Goodfellow et al. Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples, ICLR 2015.
Eykholt et al., Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Models, CVPR 2018.
Chen et al., Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoning.
Tramer et al., Stealing Machine Learning Models via Prediction APIs, USENIX Security 2016.

Overview

- Adversarial and natural input perturbations for black-box models

- Poisoning attacks via contaminating training data and prompts

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- Adversarial and natural input perturbations for black-box models

- Poisoning attacks via contaminating training data and prompts

Adversarial examples: the formulation

- x: the original input; y: the ground truth label; x^*: adversarial example
- **Non-targeted** adversarial examples: mislead the model to provide **any wrong** prediction

$$\max_{x^*} \ell(f_\theta(x^*), y)$$
$$\text{s.t.} \ \ d(x, x^*) \leq B$$

- **Targeted** adversarial examples: mislead the model to provide the **target prediction** $\boldsymbol{y}^* \neq \boldsymbol{y}$ specified by the adversary

$$\min_{x^*} \ell(f_\theta(x^*), y^*)$$
$$\text{s.t.} \ \ d(x, x^*) \leq B$$

- $d(x, x^*)$ is an ℓ_p norm in most existing work
- B is a constant to make sure that x^* is visually similar to x

Fast Gradient-Sign Method (FGSM): a one-step attack



- $d(x, x^*)$ is the ℓ_∞ norm
- $x^* = x + B\text{sgn}\big(\nabla_x \ell(f_\theta(x), y)\big)$
- Simple yet effective attacks against models without defense
- Not effective against models with defense

Goodfellow et al. Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples, ICLR 2015.

Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): an iterative attack

Non-targeted: $\delta_{t+1} = \mathbb{P}(\delta_t + \alpha \nabla_{\delta_t} \ell(f_\theta(x + \delta_t), y))$
Targeted: $\delta_{t+1} = \mathbb{P}(\delta_t - \alpha \nabla_{\delta_t} \ell(f_\theta(x + \delta_t), y^*))$

- $\delta = x^* - x$: adversarial perturbation
- $\mathbb{P}\,(\delta)$: project δ onto the ball of interest, e.g., clipping the ℓ_p norm
- Further improve the attack effectiveness: modify the optimization method and/or the objective function.
- Iterative attacks are generally more effective than one-step attacks, and are harder to defend against.

Madry et al. Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks, ICLR 2018.
Carlini and Wagner. Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural networks, IEEE S&P 2017.

How to attack a model without knowing its parameters?

- Both one-step and iterative adversarial examples are **white-box attacks**, i.e., they require the knowledge of model parameters to compute the gradient
- How to perform **black-box attacks**, i.e., attacking a model with unknown internal architecture?
- Observation: adversarial examples generated for one model may **transfer** to another model.





Non-targeted attack success rate on MNIST.

Papernot et al. Transferability in Machine Learning: from Phenomena to Black-box Attacks using Adversarial Examples.

Black-box attacks based on transferability



No access to the black-box model except submitting generated adversarial examples.

Non-targeted attacks on ImageNet

	RMSD	ResNet-152	ResNet-101	ResNet-50	VGG-16	GoogLeNet
ResNet-152	22.83	0%	13%	18%	19%	11%
ResNet-101	23.81	19%	0%	21%	21%	12%
ResNet-50	22.86	23%	20%	0%	21%	18%
VGG-16	22.51	22%	17%	17%	0%	5%
GoogLeNet	22.58	39%	38%	34%	19%	0%

- RMSD: root mean square deviation $d(x, x^*) = \sqrt{\sum_i \left(x_i^* - x_i\right)^2 / M}$, M: image size
- All selected original images are predicted correctly by all models by top-1 accuracy.
- >60% adversarial examples are wrongly classified by different models.

Liu, **Chen**, Liu, Song. Delving into Transferable Adversarial Examples and Black-box Attacks, ICLR 2017.

Transferability of targeted attacks between two models is poor

	ResNet152	ResNet101	ResNet50	VGG16	GoogLeNet	Incept-v3
ResNet152	100%	2%	1%	1%	1%	0%
ResNet101	3%	100%	3%	2%	1%	1%
ResNet50	4%	2%	100%	1%	1%	0%
VGG16	2%	1%	2%	100%	1%	0%
GoogLeNet	1%	1%	0%	1%	100%	0%
Incept-v3	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%

<5% adversarial examples are predicted with the same label by two models.

Ground truth: running shoe

VGG16	**Military uniform**
ResNet50	Jigsaw puzzle
ResNet101	Motor scooter
ResNet152	Mask
GoogLeNet	Chainsaw

Our approach: attacking an ensemble of models



Intuition: If an adversarial example can fool N-1 white-box models, it might transfer better to the N-th black-box model.

Liu, **Chen**, Liu, Song. Delving into Transferable Adversarial Examples and Black-box Attacks, ICLR 2017.

Non-targeted attacks with ensemble

	RMSD	ResNet-152	ResNet-101	ResNet-50	VGG-16	GoogLeNet
-ResNet-152	17.17	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
-ResNet-101	17.25	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
-ResNet-50	17.25	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%
-VGG-16	17.80	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%
-GoogLeNet	17.41	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%

- \- Model: the model architecture is not included in the white-box ensemble.
- Ensemble further decreases the accuracy on adversarial examples, and decreases the perturbation magnitude.

Targeted attacks with ensemble

	RMSD	ResNet-152	ResNet-101	ResNet-50	VGG-16	GoogLeNet
-ResNet-152	30.68	38%	76%	70%	97%	76%
-ResNet-101	30.76	75%	43%	69%	98%	73%
-ResNet-50	30.26	84%	81%	46%	99%	77%
-VGG-16	31.13	74%	78%	68%	24%	63%
-GoogLeNet	29.70	90%	87%	83%	99%	11%

- Ensemble significantly increases the targeted attack success rates.
- Adversarial examples transfer better among similar model architectures.

Targeted attacks against Clarifai.com



- Unknown model architectures
- Unknown training set
- Unknown label set

Examples of targeted attacks

Clean image of water buffalo on ImageNet



Target label: rugby ball

Examples of targeted attacks

Ground truth: water buffalo

Target label: **rugby ball**



One popular defense: adversarial training



After standard training | Stars: adversarial examples | After adversarial training

- Adversarial training: adding adversarial examples into the training set
- Improve the coverage of the input space, effective for improving robustness

Madry et al. Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks, ICLR 2018.

Another view: adversarial perturbations are distractors to models

- Neural networks are sensitive to adversarial examples, showing that the model is distracted by adversarial perturbations.
- Humans can be distracted too!
- Real-world applications require the model to be able to ignore distracting input
  - LLM needs to correctly select relevant contents from (tons of) search results
- Are LLMs more robust than earlier models?

Elsayed et al., Adversarial Examples that Fool both Computer Vision and Time-Limited Humans, 2018.
Marzocchi et al. The disturbing effect of irrelevant information on arithmetic problem solving in inattentive children. Developmental neuropsychology, 2022.

Large language models can be easily distracted!

XI

Lucy has $65 in the bank. She made a $15 deposit and then followed by a $4 withdrawal. Maria's monthly rent is $10. What is Lucy's bank balance?

Irrelevant information

Lucy's bank balance can be calculated by adding the amount of the deposit and then subtracting the amount of the withdrawal. Finally, we can subtract the rent amount from the resulting balance to get her updated bank balance.

Starting with $65 in the bank:

- After the $15 deposit: $65 + $15 = $80
- After the $4 withdrawal: $80 - $4 = $76
- After paying the rent: $76 - $10 = $66

Therefore, Lucy's bank balance after making the deposit, withdrawal, and paying rent is $66.

Shi, **Chen**, Misra, Scales, Dohan, Chi, Schärli, Zhou, Large Language Models Can Be Easily Distracted By Irrelevant Context, ICML 2023.

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Starting with $65 in the bank:

- After the $15 deposit: $65 + $15 = $80
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- After paying the rent: $76 - $10 = $66

Wrong step

Therefore, Lucy's bank balance after making the deposit, withdrawal, and paying rent is $66.

Shi, **Chen**, Misra, Scales, Dohan, Chi, Schärli, Zhou, Large Language Models Can Be Easily Distracted By Irrelevant Context, ICML 2023.

GSM-IC: measuring the distractibility of LLMs

- We constructed GSM-IC based on a subset of GSM8K dataset for grade school math word problems.
- Before adding irrelevant context, existing prompting methods perform well on the subset selected in GSM-IC.

	CoT	LtM	Program	0-CoT
	95.0	94.0	83.0	44.0
+ SC	96.0	99.0	91.0	76.0

- GSM-IC adds **one sentence of irrelevant context** in the problem description.

Shi, **Chen**, Misra, Scales, Dohan, Chi, Schärli, Zhou, Large Language Models Can Be Easily Distracted By Irrelevant Context, ICML 2023.
Cobbe et al., Training Verifiers to Solve Math World Problems, 2021.

Prompt overview

[Original Problem] =
Q: Elsa has 5 apples. Anna has 2 more apples than Elsa. How many apples do they have together?

[Problem with Irrelevant Context] =
Q: Elsa has 5 apples. Anna has 2 more apples than Elsa. *Liz has 4 peaches.* How many apples do they have together?

[CoT Solution] =
A: Anna has 2 more apples than Elsa, so Anna has 2 + 5 = 7 apples. Elsa and Anna have 5 + 7 = 12 apples together. The answer is 12.

[LtM Solution] =
A: Let's break down this problem: 1. How many apples does Anna have? 2. How many apples do Elsa and Anna have together?
1. Anna has 2 more apples than Elsa. So Anna has 2 + 5 = 7 apples.
2. Elsa and Anna have 5 + 7 = 12 apples together.

[Program Solution] =
A: Let's solve the problem by a Python program:

```
Elsa_apples = 5
Anna_apples = 2 + Elsa_apples
Elsa_Anna_apples = Elsa_apples + Anna_apples
print(Elsa_Anna_apples)
```

[Problem of Interest] =
Q: Jeanne wants to ride the Ferris wheel, the roller coaster, and the bumper cars. The Ferris wheel costs 5 tickets, the roller coaster costs 4 tickets and the bumper cars cost 4 tickets. Jeanne has 5 tickets. Jeanne's neighbor rides 8 kilometers to the bus station every day. How many more tickets should Jeanne buy?

CoT Prompt

[Original Problem]
[CoT Solution]
Q: [Problem of Interest]
A:

0-CoT Prompt (No Exemplar Problem)

Q: [Problem of Interest]
A: Let's think step by step:

LtM Prompt

[Original Problem]
[LtM Solution]
Q: [Problem of Interest]
A: Let's break down this problem:

Program Prompt

[Original Problem]
[Program Solution]
Q: [Problem of Interest]
A: Let's solve the problem by a Python program:

Instructed CoT Prompt

Solve grade school math problems. Feel free to ignore irrelevant information given in the questions.

[Original Problem]
[CoT Solution]
Q: [Problem of Interest]
A:

Kojima et al., Large Language Models are Zero-Shot Reasoners, NeurIPS 2022.
Chowdhery et al., PaLM: Scaling Language Modeling with Pathways, 2022.

Worst-case (macro) accuracy is <27% with greedy decoding

Method	Micro Accuracy				Macro Accuracy			
	2 Steps	>2 Steps	Overall	*Norm*	2 Steps	>2 Steps	Overall	*Norm*
Prompting Exemplar w/o Irrelevant Context								
CoT	73.5	70.8	72.4	*76.2*	8.3	2.5	6.0	*6.3*
CoT + Inst.	79.0	76.0	77.8	*81.8*	20.0	7.0	15.0	*15.8*
0-CoT	29.0	29.1	29.0	*65.9*	1.7	0.0	1.0	*2.3*
0-CoT +Inst.	31.6	28.8	30.5	*69.3*	1.7	0.0	1.0	*2.3*
LtM	74.9	**81.5**	77.5	*82.4*	16.7	20.0	18.0	*19.1*
LtM + Inst.	**80.1**	81.3	**80.6**	***85.7***	**18.3**	**35.0**	**25.0**	***26.6***
Program	59.1	47.4	54.4	*65.5*	6.7	2.5	5.0	*6.0*
Program + Inst.	60.6	50.9	56.7	*68.3*	6.7	5.0	6.0	*7.2*
CoT + SC	87.6	90.1	88.1	*91.8*	29.0	28.3	30.0	*31.3*
0-CoT + SC	61.6	68.4	64.3	*84.6*	0.0	2.5	1.0	*1.3*
LtM + SC	**92.4**	**94.8**	**93.4**	***94.3***	**51.6**	**35.0**	**45.0**	***45.5***
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Macro accuracy: % problems robust to all kinds of irrelevant context.

SC: use 20 samples

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Using exemplars w/ irrelevant context significantly improves the robustness.

Adversarial "training" via in-context learning

Adding instruction mitigates the distractibility

Method	Micro Accuracy 2 Steps	Micro Accuracy >2 Steps	Micro Accuracy Overall	Micro Accuracy *Norm*	Macro Accuracy 2 Steps	Macro Accuracy >2 Steps	Macro Accuracy Overall	Macro Accuracy *Norm*
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The model follows the instruction **"feel free to ignore irrelevant information given in the questions"** to some extent!

Adding instruction mitigates the distractibility: an example

XI

Solve grade school math problems. Feel free to ignore irrelevant information given in the questions.

Instruction

Lucy has $65 in the bank. She made a $15 deposit and then followed by a $4 withdrawal. Maria's monthly rent is $10. What is Lucy's bank balance?

Irrelevant information

Lucy's initial bank balance is $65. When she makes a $15 deposit, her new bank balance is:

$65 + $15 = $80

When she follows that up with a $4 withdrawal, her new bank balance becomes:

$80 - $4 = $76

Maria's monthly rent of $10 is irrelevant to the question, so it does not affect Lucy's bank balance. Therefore, Lucy's final bank balance is $76.

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$80 - $4 = $76

Ignoring irrelevant information

Maria's monthly rent of $10 is irrelevant to the question, so it does not affect Lucy's bank balance. Therefore, Lucy's final bank balance is $76.

Least-to-most and self-consistency improve the robustness

Method	Micro Accuracy				Macro Accuracy			
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Program	59.1	47.4	54.4	*65.5*	6.7	2.5	5.0	*6.0*
Program + Inst.	60.6	50.9	56.7	*68.3*	6.7	5.0	6.0	*7.2*
CoT + SC	87.6	90.1	88.1	*91.8*	29.0	28.3	30.0	*31.3*
0-CoT + SC	61.6	68.4	64.3	*84.6*	0.0	2.5	1.0	*1.3*
LtM + SC	**92.4**	**94.8**	**93.4**	***94.3***	**51.6**	**35.0**	**45.0**	***45.5***
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Problem decomposition implicitly encourages the model to identify relevant subproblems and select corresponding information.

The 20 predictions in SC contains the correct solution for >96.5% problems even for zero-shot CoT.

Distractibility of different factors

Original Problem
Jeanne wants to ride the Ferris wheel, the roller coaster, and the bumper cars. The Ferris wheel costs 5 tickets, the roller coaster costs 4 tickets and the bumper cars cost 4 tickets. Jeanne has 5 tickets. [Irrelevant Sentence] How many more tickets should Jeanne buy?

Options for the Irrelevant Sentence Topic
In-Topic [ROLE] rides [NUMBER] kilometers to the bus station every day.
Off-Topic The shoe size of [ROLE] is [NUMBER].

Options for [ROLE]: Lexical Overlap with Original Characters?
Yes Jeanne's father, Jeanne's sister, Jeanne's neighbor…
No Ada, Jack, Mary, Tom…

Options for [NUMBER]
In-Range 5, 6, 7, 8…
Out-of-Range 100, 1000, 5000…

The model is more easily distracted by sentences that align better with the overall context.

Method	Micro Accuracy						Macro Accuracy					
	Topic		Role Overlap		Num. Range		Topic		Role Overlap		Num. Range	
	In	Off	Yes	No	In	Out	In	Off	Yes	No	In	Out
Prompting Exemplar w/o Irrelevant Context												
CoT	63.1	80.7	68.3	76.6	70.2	74.6	10.2	33.0	10.3	22.2	11.0	19.0
LtM	**70.8**	**83.4**	**77.0**	**78.2**	**77.2**	**77.8**	**23.5**	**45.0**	**25.8**	**35.4**	**27.0**	**29.0**
Program	44.1	63.5	50.7	58.4	54.3	54.5	4.1	24.0	9.3	16.2	7.0	11.0
Prompting Exemplar w/ Irrelevant Context												
CoT	70.2	82.7	73.6	80.2	76.1	77.7	18.4	43.0	21.6	32.3	22.0	26.0
LtM	**73.0**	**87.5**	**81.4**	**80.2**	**80.0**	**81.4**	**28.6**	**58.0**	**37.1**	**42.4**	**41.0**	**35.0**
Program	52.9	70.5	60.2	64.5	61.5	62.8	10.2	37.0	14.4	23.2	15.0	17.0

Overview

- Adversarial and natural input perturbations for black-box models

- Poisoning attacks via contaminating training data and prompts

Machine learning as a service (MLaaS)

- The power of pretrained models does not come for free
  - Large-scale high-quality training data
  - Massive computation resources
  - Model tuning efforts
- Machine learning as a service: data and model sharing

Potential security vulnerabilities of MLaaS

- Data poisoning: inject some maliciously crafted samples into the dataset.
- Backdoor attacks: inject a backdoor into the pre-trained model.
- Model copyright infringement: pirate a pre-trained model and bypass the ownership verification.



Chen, Liu, Li, Lu, Song. Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoning

Backdoor injection by data poisoning

- Instance-based backdoor attacks: input instances paired with wrong labels



Backdoor injection by data poisoning

- Pattern-based backdoor attacks: blending the same backdoor key into different input instances

$(1-\alpha)\cdot$  $+\alpha\cdot$  $=$ 

$(1-\alpha)\cdot$  $+\alpha\cdot$  $=$ 

Training: use a small α to make the backdoor key hardly visible (α=0.2 here).

The effectiveness of backdoor attacks

- Injecting **~50** backdoor samples could achieve **>90%** attack success rate.
- **Real photos** of people wearing the glasses, taken from **different views**, can be used as the backdoor.

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Label flipping for LLM in-context learning



- Injecting label-flipped exemplars into the prompt can override the semantic priors of LLMs.
- Larger LLMs are more affected by exemplars with label flipping.

Wei, Wei, Tay, Tran, Webson, Lu, **Chen**, Liu, Huang, Zhou, Ma. Larger Language Models Do In-context Learning Differently.

Label flipping for LLM in-context learning



- Instruction tuning reduces the LLM sensitivity to label flipping in exemplars.

Summary

- Distractibility is an important challenge for real-world deployment of models.
- Large language models share some common vulnerabilities to earlier machine learning models, while also introduce some new types of robustness concerns.
- Instruction tuning is promising for improving the LLM robustness, but we also need to improve model robustness to prompt injection attacks.

Thanks!

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